I establish a positive relationship between family ties and civic virtues, as captured by disapproval of tax and bene…t cheating, corruption, and a range of other dimensions of exploiting others for personal gain. I …nd that family ties are a complement to social capital, using within country evidence from 83 nations and data on second generation immigrants in 29 countries with ancestry in 85 nations. Strong families cultivate universalist values and produce more civic and altruistic individuals. The results provide a constructive role for families in promoting family values that support successful societies with a high state and …scal capacity.
Introduction
The discussion of the reaches of morality dates back to Plato's 'Republic,'where Socrates asks Polemarchus about what justice (doing the morally right thing) entails. He replies that it's helping your friends and harming your enemies.
Traditionally, moral behavior was the way you treated those in your "in-group" as opposed to outsiders. Modern philosophers (such as Mill and Kant) have argued that moral principles apply universally, hence including all of humanity in the "in-group."
University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics, Øster Farimagsgade 5, building 26, 1353 København K, Denmark, martinljunge@gmail.com. I appreciate comments and suggestions by Alberto Alesina, Pierre Cahuc, Avner Greif, and Andrea Ichino, as well as participants at seminars and conferences in various places. James Q. Wilson's (1993) Wilson argues that individuals have a potential to develop certain morals through habituation of good behavior. Habituation must begin at an early age, and hence it rests upon parents to develop the child's potential. Wilson (1993) argues that families promote altruism by imparting sympathy, a sense of controlling one's destiny through teaching self-control, and trustworthiness through duty. The more attached you are to your family the more likely you will develop universalist principles and civic behaviors. Wilson (1993) argues for an intrinsic motivation in parents to have civic children, beyond what can be motivated by material payo¤s. I …nd that family ties are strongly associated with attitudes that are im- 1 Also criminals want their children to lead a more civic life, as Wilson (1993) discusses. Of course, the intrinsic valuation of civic children is not always realized, for example due to circumstances in the family's environment. 2 Wilson also acknowledges that parent's may value civic children if their civicness re ‡ects well upon the parents. Both of these motives could be part of a cultural transmission model like Bisin and Verdier (2001) . A model that explicitly di¤erentiates between the intrinsic motivation and the image concern is Benabou and Tirole (2006) . portant for building societies with higher mutual respect and …scal capacity, attitudes I label 'civic virtues.' One such virtue is to not take advantage of other members of society, or impose on them, for personal gain. 3 These virtues facilitate cooperation among members of a community. 4 Individuals with strong family ties are more disapproving of tax and bene…t cheating, black market activities, corruption, and lying in your own interest.
Individuals with strong family ties also think it is more important that children learn tolerance and respect. These attitudes may capture di¤erent facets of trustworthiness. The …ndings support the hypothesis that strong family ties help build a strong civil society, where individuals don't exploit other community members for private bene…ts in line with Wilson (1993) . Although some uncivic activities might build on strong family ties the results show that the detrimental e¤ect of family ties does not generalize in the population. In fact, for the average person stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues.
My empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First I study correlations be- The results have implications that go beyond state capacity to resolve puzzles in public …nance related to the low levels of observed tax evasion despite low detection probabilities. 6 I …nd that individuals with stronger family ties are more opposed to tax evasion. As many businesses are run by families, 7 it may be part of the explanation of the limited evasion rates among the self-employed.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the data on the 5 Algan and Cahuc (2009) analyze civicness and labor market institutions across countries. 6 Even among the self-employed, who self-report their income and have the largest scope for evading taxes, evasion is low. Six out of seven tax payers with self-employment income do not evade taxes in Denmark, as found in the randomized experiment studied by Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, and Saez (2011). 7 See for example Bertrand and Schoar (2006) for a discussion of the signi…cance of family businesses.
measures of family ties and civic virtues, as well as the empirical speci…cation.
The following section presents the results on civic virtues and family ties. The analysis of the second generation immigrants is presented in section 4. The last section concludes. 
Data and Speci…cation

Family Ties
The main variable of interest is family ties and how it is related to a range of attitudes. I use three di¤erent measures of family ties. The …rst measure is based on one question from the EVS/WVS. The question assesses how important family is in the person's life. The variable is closely related to the idea of family ties in Wilson (1993) . Answers are recorded in four categories and range from very important to not at all important. I code the variable such that a higher value captures stronger family ties.
The second measure of family ties is based on the question above, the importance of family, and two other questions from the EVS/WVS. The second question asks the respondent to agree with one of the two statements: 1) Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them, 2) One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it. I code alternative 1) as expressing stronger family ties. The third question prompts respondents to agree with one of the follow-ing statements: 1) It is the parents' duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being; 2) Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacri…ce their own well-being for the sake of their children. Again, I code alternative 1) as expressing stronger family ties.
As the second measure of family ties I summarize these three expressions of family ties by extracting their …rst principal component. 8 The averages of the three measures of family ties are positively correlated.
However, the correlations are far from perfect. 10 It indicates that the measures based on attitudes and behavior capture di¤erent facets of family ties. Table   A1 presents the summary statistics for the EVS/WVS data.
Civic Virtues
I de…ne civic virtues as disapproval of exploiting others for personal gain, as well as attitudes toward tolerance, respect, and altruism. These virtues are a component of Putnam's (1995) de…nition of social capital, which includes "norms [...] that enable participants to act together more e¤ectively to pursue shared objectives." Norms against taking advantage of others for personal bene…t would also be part of the more narrow civic capital, de…ned as "those persistent and 8 Also see for the construction of this family ties variable. 9 Moreover, Todd (1990) also discusses how inheritance law divides family types into 'equal' and 'unequal.' Since I study individuals within country the direct e¤ect of inheritance law is captured by the country …xed e¤ect.
1 0 The correlation between the importance of family and the principal component of family ties is quite high at 0.78. The fraction who live with their parents has a much lower correlation with the principle component of family ties, at 0.58. shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities" by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2010).
I focus on a set of variables that capture several dimensions of civic virtues.
The common denominator among these virtues is a trade-o¤ between personal gains at the expense of members of society. I consider it a civic virtue when individuals don't think it is right to exploit strangers for private bene…ts. It may be akin to the 'golden rule,' which states one should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself.
To capture speci…c dimensions of civic virtues I turn to questions that assess how justi…able a range of activities are in the eyes of the respondent. The respondent is to say "for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justi…ed, never be justi…ed, or something in between". The statements are "Cheating on taxes if you have a chance"; "Claiming government bene…ts to which you are not entitled"; "Avoiding a fare on public transport"; "Paying cash for services to avoid taxes"; "Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties"; "Lying in your own interest"; "Throwing away litter in a public place"; "Driving under the in ‡uence of alcohol"; "Speeding over the limit in built-up areas"; "Smoking in public buildings"; "Failing to report damage you've done accidentally to a parked vehicle"; "Buy stolen goods." Answers to each statement are coded from 1, never justi…ed, to 10, always justi…ed. Wilson (1993) would argue that these behaviors can't be justi…ed, either based on duty (being faithful to obligations), or sympathy. He discusses both tax cheating and lying explicitly.
The least justi…able behavior is driving under the in ‡uence, with an average of 1.5, and the most accepted behavior is smoking in a public building, with an average of 3.4. The majority of the observations are at the lower end of the range. The mode is 1, never justi…able, across all questions and in a majority of the questions the median is 1. This indicates that the norm is that none of these behaviors are justi…able.
There could be a concern that individuals report a higher disapproval in order to "look good" to the interviewer, and such behavior could di¤er across countries. Since the main results are based on within country variation they are not a¤ected by such di¤erences. Yet, there is evidence that individuals report truthfully in surveys even if there are incentives to lie as analyzed by Abeler, Becker, Falk, and Seidmann (2011), which may alleviate such concerns. 11 Furthermore, I use several measures of civicness, presented below, that might be much less susceptible to the concern to "look good."
I also consider qualities children can be encouraged to learn at home. The two dimensions I study focus on how we get along with people in society. The two qualities which the respondent may consider especially important are "Good manners" and "Tolerance and respect for other people."
Lack of control, that outcomes are determined by external forces, may make it harder to pursue socially valuable activities. Wilson (1993 Wilson ( , 1998 
Empirical Speci…cation
I run a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the following form:
1 1 They ask respondents to ‡ip a coin four times in private (no monitoring), and respondents are paid £ 15 for each head reported to the interviewer (tail pays nothing). The reported distribution matches that of a large sample of independent coin ‡ips, indicating that individuals report truthfully. When repeated in the lab, however, too many heads are reported. 1 2 The results are robust to using an ordered logit or an ordered probit estimator.
where the dependent variable captures the realization of a particular variable for individual i residing in country c at time t, where time is given by the survey wave. F amily_ties ict is the variable of main interest, which is increasing in the strength of family ties. The controls are included in X it . I also include a full set of country-by-wave …xed e¤ects, represented by ct , which accounts for aggregate levels and time trends for each country. Hence, the variation I use to identify 1 is only due to di¤erences in family ties within countries while also accounting for non-linear time trends within countries. All regressions include a set of demographic controls, as the attitudes I examine may vary with individual characteristics. I control for age and its square, gender, marital status, education, employment status, income, 14 and religion. Table 1 and 2 present the …ndings where family ties are measured by the importance put on family.
Family ties measured by importance of family
The estimated coe¢ cient on family ties is negative and strongly signi…cant across the speci…cations in Table 1 . Beginning with the …rst column, stronger family ties are associated with less justi…cation of tax cheating. Hence, tax cheating, which may give private bene…ts at the expense of the anonymous tax payer, is tolerated less among those with strong family ties. The same goes for bene…t cheating as seen in the second speci…cation. The estimated coe¢ cients are quantitatively signi…cant. Consider the tax cheating estimates in the …rst column.
A one standard deviation increase in the strength of family ties corresponds to one and a half times the di¤erence between having a college degree versus less than a high school degree.
Paying with cash to avoid taxes, a form of tax cheating, is seen as less justi…ed among those with stronger ties. Furthermore, not paying for public transit is looked upon less keenly by those with tighter families. Getting private bene…ts at the tax payers'expense is less tolerated among those with stronger family ties.
Individuals with stronger family ties are more opposed to someone taking a bribe than those with weaker ties, as seen in column 5. It does not seem like strong family ties support an equilibrium with a high level of corruption.
Telling the truth is another civic virtue that is cherished more among those with stronger family ties. Stronger family ties are associated with a lower acceptance of lying in your own interest. This attitude may make it harder to sustain an equilibrium with corrupt politicians.
Among the control variables it may noted that the self-employed are more accepting of tax cheating but less so regarding bene…t cheating. 15 Part-time employees are more accepting of bene…t cheating and riding public transit without paying the fare. Older individuals, women, Protestants, those married, and with higher education are associated with less accepting attitudes across the di¤erent dimensions in Table 1 .
The control variable Married is of particular interest since married individuals may be considered as having stronger family ties compared to the omitted category divorced and widowed. The estimate on being married hence provides another test of the hypothesis. The point estimates are strongly signi…cant across the di¤erent measures and all point to stronger ties being associated with more civicness. The marriage indicator provides a validation of the results from the main measures of family ties.
I present further evidence on how stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues in Table 2 . I …nd that also in these dimensions, which may be more mundane or more personal, manifestations of mutual respect are stronger for those with stronger family ties. Littering in a public place, which may be convenient for the individual but a nuisance to those using the public place, is less tolerated by people with strong family ties. Both driving under the in ‡uence and speeding in urban areas, which may give private bene…ts to the driver but put others at higher risk, are less acceptable to individuals with strong family ties, as seen in the second and third columns. Failure to report damage one has done by accident to a parked vehicle is less tolerated among those with strong ties. Disapproval of smoking in public buildings is stronger among those with tighter family ties, as is the disapproval of buying stolen goods.
The following two columns of Table 2 analyze the relationship between family ties and two qualities that are singled out as especially important for children to learn at home. The …rst is good manners. Manners are rules of conduct that may make it easier for people to get along in society. Living by these manners may come at a private cost, holding the door open for someone takes time that could be spent di¤erently, and the good manners provide bene…ts to others in society, for example the person you hold the door for. Wilson (1993) argues that manners have evolved to display self-control and that you are not hostile to strangers. Repeated display of bad manners may indicate that "you do not have the state of character to restrain you from preferring your own immediate advantage over the more rightful and more distant interests of others." 16 Individuals with stronger family ties think that it is more important that children learn good manners. Also in this dimension I …nd that stronger 1 6 Wilson (1993), page 85.
family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues.
I …nd the same result for the second child quality, tolerance and respect for other people, which may be one of the fundamental civic virtues. The stronger the family ties, the more important individuals think it is that children learn tolerance and respect for other people. This also points to a mechanism for the transmission of civic virtues. Individuals with strong family ties stress the importance of teaching children tolerance and respect for others. This intergenerational transmission mechanism may explain the presence of these civic attitudes within families with strong ties.
The last column examines the extent to which individuals think they can control their own lives. Wilson (1993) argues that strong families socialize their children to believe they can a¤ect their outcomes. I …nd that individuals with stronger family ties express a higher freedom of choice and control over their lives, which support Wilson.
Family ties based on three attitudes
The results thus far were based on the question on how important family is.
Next, I use the principal component of three questions that capture family ties as de…ned above. This measure is naturally highly correlated with the importance of family since the question is one component, but the correlation of 0.78 shows that the measure captures di¤erent facets of family ties. The estimates of the variable of main interest, family ties, are presented in Table 3 . The results are very similar to Tables 1 and 2 . Stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues both with respect to disapproval of exploiting others, the child qualities, and the sense of control over one's life. The estimates on the individual control variables are similar to those reported earlier.
Family ties measured by living arrangements
The third measure of family ties, whether the individual lives with his or her parents, is very di¤erent since it is based on behavior. The physical proximity to your parents would signal strong family ties. With this measure of family ties it is important to compare individuals with similar characteristics but who di¤er in their living arrangements, since the decision to reside with your parents may be in ‡uenced by your labor market outcomes for example. Accounting for these factors by controlling for labor market attachment, income, etc. is hence crucial. The results in Table 4 are similar to the previous tables, although not as strong. A majority of the estimates are signi…cant, and all the signi…cant estimates have the expected sign.
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There is also some evidence of a complementarity across the di¤erent measures of family ties. I …nd those who express strong family ties and live with their parents in several cases are even more opposed to exploiting others for personal gain, compared to those who express as strong family ties but do not live with their parents. This compounding e¤ect is also signi…cant for the importance of children to learn tolerance and respect. cases I …nd that countries with stronger disapproval of bribes also display signi…cantly less corruption. The …rst measure is the corruption perception index from Transparency International. The second measure is the quality of gov- 1 7 For the attitudes toward the degree of control over one's life there is a built in simultaneity problem, since living with your parents may impose restrictions on your freedom of choice. ernment, where corruption is a large component, in the International Country Risk Guide from the PRS group. The third measure is the control of corruption estimate from the World Bank Governance Indicators. 18 The evidence suggests that the attitudes I study also re ‡ect behavior.
Taking Stock
Evidence from Second Generation Immigrants
To establish a direction of causality, that family ties a¤ect civic virtues, I study second generation immigrants. Fernandez (2010) describes how this approach can be used to study the causal impact of beliefs on outcomes. 19 Most studies have used data from the U.S., but I contribute to an emerging literature studying 
Data
The ESS is conducted on representative samples in European countries. 20 The questions in the survey cover a range of aspects including labor market attachment, attitudes toward society, as well as standard demographic characteristics.
One essential feature of the data is that the survey asks about the country 1 8 I use the data compiled by Sammanni et al (2010). 1 9 Fernandez (2010) handbook chapter also provide an extensive survey of the empirical evidence.
2 0 Extensive documentation of the data is found at http://ess.nsd.uib.no.
of birth of the respondent as well as the country of birth of both parents. 21 This information allows me to identify second generation immigrants and which countries their parents originate from.
I de…ne a second generation immigrant as a respondent who is born in the country of residence but whose mother or father is born in a di¤erent country. Table   A2 . There are no signi…cant di¤erences in the characteristics of those with immigrant mothers and fathers, and they are not signi…cantly di¤erent from the rest of the population either. The participating countries in each round of the ESS are presented in Table A3 .
Dependent Variables 4.2.1 Civic Virtues
The ESS is relatively limited in the questions regarding civic virtues in com- 
Empirical Speci…cation
I run a number of OLS regression of the following form: Moreover, the empirical approach produces a conservative estimate of 1 .
The underlying model would be that the parent's family ties would a¤ect the child's outcome, but I use the average family ties in the parent's birth country as shifter that does not su¤er from the reverse causality concern. 25 Since there is substantial variation in parents'family ties in a population the average level of family ties in the parent's birth country, the variable F amily_T ies a in the analysis, is not perfectly related to the parent's family ties. This produces an attenuation bias in the method, biasing the estimate of 1 toward zero. The estimate of 1 is hence conservative, and …nding a signi…cant e¤ect in spite of this bias would be strong evidence that the e¤ect is present. 2 3 For example, I am comparing if individuals with French ancestry residing in Germany have systematically higher outcomes compared to those with Italian ancestry residing in Germany. 2 4 As a comparison, Luttmer and Singhal (2011) study immigrants from 32 countries. 2 5 The parent's individual value is not observed. I am hence estimating the 'reduced form. ' 
Results
The …rst results show a positive e¤ect of family ties on civic virtues. Family ties are measured in the parent's birth country and captures the cultural transmission of this trait on the outcomes of the second generation immigrants, who have been born into a di¤erent country with a separate institutional and cultural environment. The measure of family ties in the parent's birth country hence captures the impact of this cultural trait on the respondent. All the following regressions condition on the respondent being born in the country of the interview and that the mother/father is born in a di¤erent country.
Civic Attitudes
In the …rst speci…cation of Table 5 I examine the e¤ect of family ties in the mother's birth country on the respondent's expressed importance of helping others, the …rst measure of civic virtues in the ESS. In Table 5 I measure family ties by the fraction of individuals who live with their parents. A higher fraction measures stronger family ties. The estimated coe¢ cient is positive and strongly signi…cant. It means that respondents with a mother from a strong family ties country think it is more important to help others, compared to an individual living in the same country but with weak family ties ancestry. This is similar to the …ndings in the EVS/WVS that stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues. However, by using the sample of second generation immigrants I can establish the direction of causality from family ties to civicness, as the family ties in the parent's country of birth is not endogenous to the respondent's outcome. In the second speci…cation I consider the other measure of civicness, the importance of behaving properly. The point estimate is positive as expected and highly signi…cant.
In the third and fourth speci…cations I regress the same measures of civic virtues on family ties, again measured as the fraction living with their parents, in the father's country of birth (for the sample of second generation immigrants with an immigrant father). For both measures the point estimates are positive and signi…cant. 26 There is hence evidence of a causal impact of family ties from both parents. 27 ; 28
The demographic variables display estimates similar to the earlier analysis, indicating that the measures of civic virtues as well as the sample of second generation immigrants are similar to the previous analysis. As marriage may be a marker stronger of family ties it is particularly interesting. The point estimates on Marriage in Table 5 are all positive, and in all but one case strongly signi…cant, which further corroborates the …nding that stronger families are more civic.
Next, I examine the same questions with a di¤erent measure of family ties.
Instead of the fraction living with parents I use the average value of the principal component of the three family question, which I used in Table 3 above. The …rst two columns of Table 6 present the results for those with an immigrant mother. 
Robustness
Could selection of immigrants a¤ect the analysis? First, second generation immigrants have not chosen to move themselves, which mitigates such concerns.
Moreover, the second generation immigrants are highly integrated (96% are citizens of their country of birth), look similar to natives on observables, and display similar coe¢ cients on the demographic controls in Table 5 . Anyway, there may be concerns that the parents are drawn from a particular part of the 2 6 The results are also robust to controlling for trust. 2 7 The results don't rule out a causal relationship from civic virtues to family ties. It is, however, not possible to estimate such a relationship since the ESS does not measure the strength of family ties. 2 8 I don't …nd a compounding e¤ect of family ties on the child's civicness if both parents are born in the same country. The lack of compounding could be due to the nature of the 'production function'of civicness or due to the smaller sample size. 2 9 Also the results in Table 6 zero.
Yet, there may be a concern that ancestry from a strong family ties country captures a less developed country ancestry, and that the level of development may confound the e¤ect of family ties. There is a signi…cant negative relationship between stronger family ties and income across countries. To separate the potential e¤ect of family ties from economic development I control for ancestral country gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in logarithms.
To address potential parental sorting into migration I include controls for the mother's and the father's education. I create dummies for upper secondary and tertiary education. This shuts down any e¤ect of family ties on civicness that would operate through parental education.
The models corresponding to Table 5 are estimated with these added controls: log ancestral GDP and four dummies for parental education. The results are presented in Table 7 . The estimate on family ties in the ancestral country is similar in magnitude and remain signi…cant indicating that the main results are not in ‡uenced by these added controls. Ancestral GDP is insigni…cant throughout, indicating the level of development in the parent's country of birth does not drive the result. The parental education dummies are in most cases insigni…cant, indicating that it does not have an important impact on the child's civicness conditional on the other variables. I have also estimated the model corresponding to Table 6 with these added controls. Again, the results are very similar.
In the results presented I use all the available data. There may be a concern that the results are in ‡uenced by ancestries with few second generation immigrants in the data. The results are similar when including ancestral countries with at least 5, 10, 20, or 50 observations. The results are not driven by small immigrant groups.
Civic Behavior
Do the stronger family ties also a¤ect civic behavior? I present evidence on two dimensions of uncivic behavior. Individuals with ancestry in countries with stronger family ties are less likely to report exaggerated or false insurance claims in the past 5 years, as seen in the …rst column of Table 8 . The estimated coe¢ cient is strongly signi…cant. Individuals are also less likely to have paid cash to avoid taxes, as the point estimate in column 2 is negative. The estimate is, however, not signi…cant. The lack of signi…cance may be due to that the question was only asked in one round of the survey, so the sample is much smaller.
When turning to the sample with immigrant fathers, the point estimate indicates that stronger family ties lead to less false or exaggerated insurance claims, although the estimate is not signi…cant, as seen in column 3. The estimate on paying cash to avoid taxes is negative and strongly signi…cant in the last column of Table 8 . The results provide some evidence that mothers and fathers may transmit values that a¤ect di¤erent kinds of behavior. Evidence of di¤erences in cultural transmission by mothers and fathers is also presented in Ljunge (2012).
The asymmetric estimates for mothers and fathers also indicate that the e¤ects are driven by socialization rather than some genetic transmission, which would have the same impact through both parents. Tables 5 through 8 provide evidence on a constructive role for families. Individuals with parents from countries with stronger family ties transmit a more civic attitude to their children. It implies that parents from countries with stronger family ties socialize their children to be more civic, lending support to Wilson's (1993) predictions. Table 8 provides evidence on that family ties also promote more civic behavior. 30 
Conclusion
Are family ties a complement to or a substitute for social capital? The main result is that family ties are a complement to social capital, in the domain of civic virtues. I …nd that individuals in strong family networks are substantially more disapproving of tax and bene…t cheating, corruption, and a range of other activities which involve a personal bene…t at the expense of other individuals.
The …ndings support Wilson's (1993) hypothesis that stronger families tend to produce individuals with universalist values and challenge the idea that modern strong families promote a morality limited to the family or clan.
I argued that the dominant norms are to not accept tax cheating and other ways of exploiting or imposing on others based on the averages in Table A1 .
It could of course be that in some families with strong ties the norm is that one takes advantage of others by for example cheating on taxes and bene…ts. The results support the idea that tightly knit groups, such as families, can promote habits that may be important for the success of the community, as suggested by Wilson (1993) . The …ndings provide a constructive role for families, as they may support communities with high levels of civic virtues and universalist values, in contrast the idea of limited morality in tightly knit families. Strong families bene…t both family members as well as society as a whole. Y i ct =b0+b1 Family_Ties i ct +b2 X it +g ct +e i ct where i is individual, c is country of residence, and t is time period. Country of residence-by-year fixed effects are captured by g ct . The dependent variable Y in columns (1)- (6) is coded from 1, never acceptable, to 10, always acceptable. In columns (7) and (8) Y is coded as 1 if mentionen and 0 otherwise. In column (9) Y ranges from 1, none at all, to 10, a great deal . Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by the parent's birth country, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. (1)- (12) is coded from 1, never acceptable, to 10, always acceptable. In columns (13) and (14) Y is coded as 1 if mentionen and 0 otherwise. In column (15) Y ranges from 1, none at all, to 10, a great deal. Included individual controls are age and its square, number of children as well as dummies for female, married, single, upper secondary degree, tertiary degree, employed (full-time), employed (part-time), 10 income groups, Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by the parent's birth country, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Y icat =b0+b1 Family_Ties a +b2 X it +g c +h t +e icat where i is individual, c is country of birth and residence, a is country of ancestry (a different from c), and t is time period. Country of residence fixed effects are captured by g c , and year effects by h t . The dependent variable Y is coded from 1, not like me at all, to 6, very much like me. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by the parent's birth country, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Y icat =b0+b1 Family_Ties a +b2 X it +g c +h t +e icat where i is individual, c is country of residence, a is country of ancestry (a different from c), and t is time period. Country of residence fixed effects are captured by g c , and year effects by h t . The dependent variable Y is coded from 1, not like me at all, to 6, very much like me. Included individual controls are age and its square as well as dummies for female, married, never married, child at home, upper secondary degree, tertiary degree, out of the labor force, unemployed, low income, middle income, Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by the parent's birth country, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Y icat =b0+b1Family_Ties a +b2X it +g c +h t +e icat where i is individual, c is country of residence, a is country of ancestry (a different from c), and t is time period. Country of residence fixed effects are captured by g c , and year effects by h t . The dependent variable Y is coded from 1, not like me at all, to 6, very much like me. Included individual controls are age and its square as well as dummies for female, married, never married, child at home, upper secondary degree, tertiary degree, out of the labor force, unemployed, low income, middle income, Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by the parent's birth country, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Y icat =b0+b1 Family_Ties a +b2 X it +g c +h t +e icat where i is individual, c is country of residence, a is country of ancestry (a different from c), and t is time period. Country of residence fixed effects are captured by g c , and year effects by h t . The dependent variable Y is coded as 1 if true at least once, and 0 otherwise. Included individual controls are age and its square as well as dummies for female, married, never married, child at home, upper secondary degree, tertiary degree, out of the labor force, unemployed, low income, middle income, Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by the parent's birth country, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
